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ABSTRACT 
 In this thesis, the problem of fair exchange on specific cases is addressed. The 
main idea of fair exchange is as follows: Two entities that do not trust each other want 
to exchange some arbitrary data over a communication network. Since they do not trust 
each other, neither party wants to transmit their own data before receiving the other 
entity’s data. Even though either party could prove an unjust situation after termination 
of the protocol, if they are in different countries, solving disputes may require time and 
money due to the bureaucracy of international laws.  
 In this thesis, a special application of fair exchange, a fair e-commerce protocol 
for large e-goods is designed and implemented. The proposed protocol provides a 
method for fair exchange of e-money to e-products, and a method for verifying the 
contents of the exchanged items. The presented protocol is efficient such that when 
none of the parties tries to cheat, only three messages are sufficient. In case of disputes, 
three more messages are needed. Furthermore, in most of the previously proposed 
protocols in the literature, e-goods are transferred multiple times among some entities. 
This situation is too costly when e-goods are large. In the presented protocol, e-goods 
are transferred only once. Another important property of the protocol is the anonymity 
of the customer; no information about the customers shopping habits can be gathered 
through the protocol. The implementation results show that the protocol is efficient and 
secure and that small number of cryptographic operations is sufficient. 
 In addition to the fair e-commerce protocol, another special application of fair 
exchange, a fair multimedia exchange protocol using a different method is designed and 
implemented. This protocol is designed due to different requirements of different 
applications.  In the fair multimedia exchange protocol, two entities want to exchange 
some multimedia files such as video or audio files. This protocol requires lower security 
and has a different a lower degree of fairness as compared to the fair e-commerce 
protocol. Fair multimedia exchange protocol uses a baby-step approach in which the 
probability of protocol completion is gradually increased over several cycles. In baby-
step approach protocols, entities exchange pieces of the items, which they want to 
barter. At protocol completion, the complete items are formed by using the pieces 
exchanged. 
 
ÖZET 
  Bu tez, adil takas problemini bazı özel durumlar için ele almaktadır. Genel 
olarak adil takas problemi, birbirlerine güvenmeyen iki tarafın rastgele seçtikleri verileri 
takas etme sorunu olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu iki taraf birbirlerine güvenmedikleri için, 
almayı bekledikleri verileri elde etmeden kendi verilerini yollamak istemezler. Bu iki 
tarafın farklı ülkelerde bulunması ve taraflardan birinin haksızlığa uğraması halinde, 
uluslar arası hukuk bürokrasisi yüzünden bu anlaşmazlığı çözmek para ve zaman 
gerektirebilir. 
 Bu tezde adil takas probleminin özel bir uygulaması olan, büyük boyutlardaki 
elektronik mallar için adil e-ticaret protokolü tasarlanmış ve uygulanmıştır. Önerilen bu 
protokol elektronik para karşılığında elektronik malları adil bir şekilde takas eder. Aynı 
zamanda takas edilen elektronik malların kalitesi ve içeriğinin kontrolünü de yapar. 
Sunulan bu protokol verimli bir şekilde çalışmaktadır. Öyleki, taraflardan hiçbiri hile 
yapmayı denemezse, sadece üç mesaj yeterlidir. Taraflardan biri hile yapmayı denerse, 
anlaşmazlığı çözmek için üç mesaja daha ihtiyaç olacaktır. Literatürde daha önce 
yapılan başka çalışmalarda önerilen protokollerde, elektronik mallar taraflar arasında 
birçok kez transfer edilmiştir. Bu durum elektronik malların büyük boyutlarda olması 
halinde yüksek maliyetlere sebep olmaktadır. Bu tezde önerilen protokolde elektronik 
mallar sadece bir kez transfer edilmektedir. Bu protokolun başka önemli bir özelliği ise 
müşterilerin kimliklerinin anonim bırakılmasıdır. Öyleki, protokol akışı sırasında 
müşterilerin alışveriş alışkanlıkları hakkında hiçbir bilgi toplanamamaktadır. Uygulama 
sonuçları,  adil e-ticaret protokolünün verimli, güvenilir ve az sayıda kriptografik 
operasyona ihtiyaç olduğunu göstermektedir. 
 Bu tezde sunulan e-ticaret protokolü dışında yine adil takas probleminin özel bir 
uygulaması olan, ancak farklı bir yöntemle tasarlanmış ve uygulanmış bir adil 
çoğulortam takas protokolü sunulmaktadır. Bu protokolü tasarımının ardındaki amaç 
farklı tipdeki uygulamaların farklı yöntem gereksinimleridir. Adil çoğulortam takas 
protokolünde iki birey birbiri ile bazı çoğulortam dosyalarını (ör: görüntü veya ses 
dosyaları) takas etmek isterler. Bu protokol adil e-ticaret protokolüne göre daha az 
güvenlik gerektirmekte ve daha düşük derecede adalet sağlamaktadır. Adil çoğulortam 
takas protokolünde bebek-adımları yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bu yöntemde protokolünün 
başarılı bir biçimde tamamlanma olasılığı her adımda artmaktadır. Taraflar değişmek 
istedikleri elektronik malları parçalara ayırıp birbirlerine sırayla bu parçaları yollarlar. 
Protokol sona erdiğinde elektronik mallar elde edilen parçalar birleştirerek oluşturulur.  
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
 
CERTTP i  : ith Certificate (in terms of price, description, and contents) of a product 
signed by the trusted third party 
H : Hash function (i.e. SHA-1) 
EX (data) : Encryption of data with key X  
E-good : An e-product or electronic item such as, database or multimedia file 
Price : Price of the e-good 
Description : A string describing contents of the product 
KUX : Public key of identity X 
KRX : Private key of identity X 
SIGX(Data) : Data signed by identity X; equivalent to EKR X  (H(Data))  
TP : Trusted third party 
M : Merchant 
C : Customer or Client 
|| : Concatenation Operation 
PID : Product Identifier 
Token : Electronic money; it contains credit card information such as credit card brand, 
credit card number, amount of money to be transferred, destination account number and 
PID . Confidential information of the token is only readable by the bank 
AÎB:X : A sends data X to B 
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ABSTRACT 
 In this thesis, the problem of fair exchange on specific cases is addressed. The 
main idea of fair exchange is as follows: Two entities that do not trust each other want 
to exchange some arbitrary data over a communication network. Since they do not trust 
each other, neither party wants to transmit their own data before receiving the other 
entity’s data. Even though either party could prove an unjust situation after termination 
of the protocol, if they are in different countries, solving disputes may require time and 
money due to the bureaucracy of international laws.  
 In this thesis, a special application of fair exchange, a fair e-commerce protocol 
for large e-goods is designed and implemented. The proposed protocol provides a 
method for fair exchange of e-money to e-products, and a method for verifying the 
contents of the exchanged items. The presented protocol is efficient such that when 
none of the parties tries to cheat, only three messages are sufficient. In case of disputes, 
three more messages are needed. Furthermore, in most of the previously proposed 
protocols in the literature, e-goods are transferred multiple times among some entities. 
This situation is too costly when e-goods are large. In the presented protocol, e-goods 
are transferred only once. Another important property of the protocol is the anonymity 
of the customer; no information about the customers shopping habits can be gathered 
through the protocol. The implementation results show that the protocol is efficient and 
secure and that small number of cryptographic operations is sufficient. 
 In addition to the fair e-commerce protocol, another special application of fair 
exchange, a fair multimedia exchange protocol using a different method is designed and 
implemented. This protocol is designed due to different requirements of different 
applications.  In the fair multimedia exchange protocol, two entities want to exchange 
some multimedia files such as video or audio files. This protocol requires lower security 
and has a different a lower degree of fairness as compared to the fair e-commerce 
protocol. Fair multimedia exchange protocol uses a baby-step approach in which the 
probability of protocol completion is gradually increased over several cycles. In baby-
step approach protocols, entities exchange pieces of the items, which they want to 
barter. At protocol completion, the complete items are formed by using the pieces 
exchanged. 
 
ÖZET 
  Bu tez, adil takas problemini bazı özel durumlar için ele almaktadır. Genel 
olarak adil takas problemi, birbirlerine güvenmeyen iki tarafın rastgele seçtikleri verileri 
takas etme sorunu olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu iki taraf birbirlerine güvenmedikleri için, 
almayı bekledikleri verileri elde etmeden kendi verilerini yollamak istemezler. Bu iki 
tarafın farklı ülkelerde bulunması ve taraflardan birinin haksızlığa uğraması halinde, 
uluslar arası hukuk bürokrasisi yüzünden bu anlaşmazlığı çözmek para ve zaman 
gerektirebilir. 
 Bu tezde adil takas probleminin özel bir uygulaması olan, büyük boyutlardaki 
elektronik mallar için adil e-ticaret protokolü tasarlanmış ve uygulanmıştır. Önerilen bu 
protokol elektronik para karşılığında elektronik malları adil bir şekilde takas eder. Aynı 
zamanda takas edilen elektronik malların kalitesi ve içeriğinin kontrolünü de yapar. 
Sunulan bu protokol verimli bir şekilde çalışmaktadır. Öyleki, taraflardan hiçbiri hile 
yapmayı denemezse, sadece üç mesaj yeterlidir. Taraflardan biri hile yapmayı denerse, 
anlaşmazlığı çözmek için üç mesaja daha ihtiyaç olacaktır. Literatürde daha önce 
yapılan başka çalışmalarda önerilen protokollerde, elektronik mallar taraflar arasında 
birçok kez transfer edilmiştir. Bu durum elektronik malların büyük boyutlarda olması 
halinde yüksek maliyetlere sebep olmaktadır. Bu tezde önerilen protokolde elektronik 
mallar sadece bir kez transfer edilmektedir. Bu protokolun başka önemli bir özelliği ise 
müşterilerin kimliklerinin anonim bırakılmasıdır. Öyleki, protokol akışı sırasında 
müşterilerin alışveriş alışkanlıkları hakkında hiçbir bilgi toplanamamaktadır. Uygulama 
sonuçları,  adil e-ticaret protokolünün verimli, güvenilir ve az sayıda kriptografik 
operasyona ihtiyaç olduğunu göstermektedir. 
 Bu tezde sunulan e-ticaret protokolü dışında yine adil takas probleminin özel bir 
uygulaması olan, ancak farklı bir yöntemle tasarlanmış ve uygulanmış bir adil 
çoğulortam takas protokolü sunulmaktadır. Bu protokolü tasarımının ardındaki amaç 
farklı tipdeki uygulamaların farklı yöntem gereksinimleridir. Adil çoğulortam takas 
protokolünde iki birey birbiri ile bazı çoğulortam dosyalarını (ör: görüntü veya ses 
dosyaları) takas etmek isterler. Bu protokol adil e-ticaret protokolüne göre daha az 
güvenlik gerektirmekte ve daha düşük derecede adalet sağlamaktadır. Adil çoğulortam 
takas protokolünde bebek-adımları yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bu yöntemde protokolünün 
başarılı bir biçimde tamamlanma olasılığı her adımda artmaktadır. Taraflar değişmek 
istedikleri elektronik malları parçalara ayırıp birbirlerine sırayla bu parçaları yollarlar. 
Protokol sona erdiğinde elektronik mallar elde edilen parçalar birleştirerek oluşturulur.  
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CERTTP i  : ith Certificate (in terms of price, description, and contents) of a product 
signed by the trusted third party 
H : Hash function (i.e. SHA-1) 
EX (data) : Encryption of data with key X  
E-good : An e-product or electronic item such as, database or multimedia file 
Price : Price of the e-good 
Description : A string describing contents of the product 
KUX : Public key of identity X 
KRX : Private key of identity X 
SIGX(Data) : Data signed by identity X; equivalent to EKR X  (H(Data))  
TP : Trusted third party 
M : Merchant 
C : Customer or Client 
|| : Concatenation Operation 
PID : Product Identifier 
Token : Electronic money; it contains credit card information such as credit card brand, 
credit card number, amount of money to be transferred, destination account number and 
PID . Confidential information of the token is only readable by the bank 
AÎB:X : A sends data X to B 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 The bottom line of an exchange protocol is to barter data fairly between two 
entities. The contents of the exchanged items may differ but the main idea is the same. 
Exchange protocols get special names according to the contents of exchanged items. 
Below, some special cases for exchange of some specific items are depicted: 
• In a contract signing protocol, digital signatures that bind two entities to the 
terms stated on a contract are exchanged.   
• In a certified mail protocol, an e-mail message is exchanged for a receipt. The 
receipt proves that the receiver of the e-mail has obtained the e-mail. 
• In an e-commerce protocol, payment is exchanged for an electronic good (e-
good). 
 The four important requirements of exchange protocols are fairness, quality 
control, client anonymity and the number of e-good transfer. 
• Fairness: An exchange protocol is considered as fair if the protocol has only 
two possible outcomes: either both entities obtain the items they expect or 
neither entity obtains any items.  
• Quality Control: An exchange protocol must prove that a claim of a definition 
of an item truly defines the contents of that item.  
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• Client Anonymity: Entities that perform exchange may decide to remain 
anonymous. Anonymity provides that identity of an entity not to be revealed 
during the transaction. For instance, a customer would not want a merchant to 
discover his/her pattern of shopping habits after performing a transaction.  
• Number of E-Good Transfer: There must not be any assumptions on the size 
of exchanged items. Therefore, the exchanged items may be very large and 
transferring these large items multiple times could be costly. For this reason, 
large items should be transferred only once per protocol run. 
 Exchange protocols can be examined in two categories: online third party 
protocols [3, 5, 9, 14 and 15] (see section 3.1.1.1 for details) and baby-step protocols 
[12 and 13] (see section 3.1.2 for details). In online third party protocols, the exchange 
is achieved via a trusted third party. Each party submits their own item to the trusted 
third party that forwards the items to the appropriate recipient entity. In baby-step 
approach protocols, items are divided into small partial items. Two entities achieve the 
exchange by swapping multiple partial items one by one. In other words, one of the 
entities sends one of his/her partial item to the other entity and waits for the other side to 
send a partial item.  This act of swapping partial items continues until the items are 
completely exchanged, hence the solution is obtained with “baby steps”.  
 Both approaches have some drawbacks [9]: Online third party protocols require 
that the third party always be at service; therefore, we need bandwidth to handle large 
amounts of traffic. This large amount of traffic routed to the third party creates a 
bottleneck in the network. Online third party protocols have a client/server architecture, 
which causes a single point of failure and requires costly precautions for continuous 
service. On the other hand, baby-step protocols may have a large overhead. In some 
cases, they provide a lower degree of fairness. 
 In order to overcome the problems stated in the online third party protocols, 
another approach, called optimistic protocols [4, 7, 8, 9 and 19], has been proposed. In 
optimistic protocols, two entities want to perform an exchange. The entity that starts the 
protocol is the initiator and the other one is the receiver. First, the initiator takes a risk 
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by sending its own item to the receiver. Second, the receiver either sends its own item 
or tries to cheat by not sending anything. If the receiver behaves honest, by sending its 
own item, the protocol is complete since both entities obtained the items they expected. 
If the initiator does not receive the item it expected, the initiator contacts the trusted 
third party for dispute resolution. The trusted third party resolves this dispute by 
sending the correct item to the initiator. Optimistic protocols use a trusted third party 
only in case of disputes. Optimistic protocols discourage cheating, since cheating is of 
no purpose. Therefore, attempts of cheating and consequently participation of a trusted 
third party would be rare. This property of keeping the trusted third party out of normal 
execution reduces network traffic at the third party. 
 In this thesis, an optimistic fair e-commerce protocol for large e-goods is 
presented. The proposed protocol provides a method for not only fair exchange of e-
money to e-goods, but also the verification of the contents of the exchanged items for 
quality control purposes. The proposed protocol is efficient; when none of the parties 
tries to cheat, only three messages are sufficient. To resolve disputes, if any, only three 
more messages are needed. In most of the previously proposed protocols in the 
literature, e-goods are transferred multiple times, which is too costly when the e-goods 
are large. In the presented protocol, e-goods are transferred only once. Another 
important property of the protocol is the anonymity of the customer; no information 
about the customer’s shopping habits can be gathered through the protocol.  
 In addition to the optimistic fair e-commerce protocol, a fair multimedia exchange 
protocol using a baby-step approach is designed in order to show that in some 
situations, baby-step protocols may be more convenient than an optimistic fair exchange 
protocol. In fair multimedia exchange protocol, two entities want to exchange some 
multimedia files such as video or audio files. The fair exchange protocol has client-
server architecture. However, fair multimedia exchange protocol works in peer-to-peer 
fashion. 
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The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
 In Section 2, background information including the fundamentals of 
cryptography, security problems and solutions are discussed. In Section 3, related work 
on exchange protocols is presented. In section 4, the proposed optimistic fair e-
commerce protocol is discussed. In section 5, the proposed multimedia exchange 
protocol is described. In section 6, implementation details of the two proposed protocols 
are depicted. In section 7, conclusions and future works are presented. Section 8 is 
appendix in which forms used in both of the implemented systems may be found. 
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2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 In today’s world, information security is an important and mandatory concept.  
There are many examples that show security can prevent costly problems or even 
shame. The most typical of these examples include disclosure of private data, malicious 
scripts, viruses, trojans, unauthorized access of resources, bogus messages such as TCP 
hijacking and repudiation on an agreement. Electronic systems may perform critical 
operations that require information security. Below, some background information 
related to the proposed thesis is presented. 
2.1 Information Security 
 Information security is about taking actions in order to prevent the corruption of 
resources, to detect who corrupted, how a resource is corrupted, and to take action to 
recover corrupted resources. For instance, during an e-commerce transaction, one must 
prevent a credit card number from being revealed, detect an unauthorized transaction, 
and resolve any kind of dispute related to an unauthorized transaction. 
 Two important aspects of information security are security services and security 
mechanisms. 
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2.1.1 Security Services 
 Security services are tools used to prevent or detect attacks. They are used to 
improve security by imitating the roles of physical tools such as signatures, seals, and 
dates on letters. 
 There exist six types of security services: confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
and non-repudiation [1]. 
2.1.1.1 Confidentiality 
 Confidentiality is an important issue when sensitive information must be protected 
from opponents or unauthorized entities. This concept is closely related to the concept 
of privacy. Mostly, confidentiality is performed with encryption/decryption operations. 
Section 2.3.1 addresses the problem of confidentiality. 
2.1.1.2 Integrity 
 One must be sure that the content of sensitive information has not been changed 
or corrupted, injected, erased and disordered. Integrity means that information 
consistency is provided and that the information is tamper-proof. This feature of 
security may be provided through Hash Based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC) 
[1], Hash functions [1] and Digital Signatures [1]. Hash functions, HMAC and Digital 
Signatures are discussed in Sections 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.3.2 respectively. 
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2.1.1.3 Authentication 
 Another major issue in security is authentication, which is the process of proving 
the identity of an individual or system. The reader is advised to read [31] for more 
information about authentication. 
2.1.1.4 Non-Repudiation 
 Non-repudiation is a proof of existence of an agreement between identified 
entities. In other words, it can be confirmed that the sender and the receiver of an 
electronic message is, in fact, the parties who claimed to send or receive the message. 
2.1.2 Security Mechanisms 
 Security mechanisms are cryptographic tools or techniques used to form security 
services in order to prevent, detect, and recover attacks. Some security mechanisms 
defined in [1] are as follows: 
• Encryption/Decryption: The process of cloaking a plaintext (clear text) 
message in such a way as to hide its contents is encryption. An encrypted 
message is called ciphertext. The process of turning ciphertext back into 
plaintext is called decryption. 
• Cryptographic Hash Function: The output of a one-way function (hash 
function) that takes a variable length input and converts it to fixed length output 
which is called Message Digest. A hash function is a function that works in one 
direction. It is easy to compute the Message Digest of arbitrary data but it is not 
easy compute the data given the Message Digest. Hash functions are the 
building block for many security services. 
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• Digital Signature: A special transformation of data, in order to provide a 
mechanism that proves the source and integrity of data. The reader is advised to 
read [32, 33, and 34] for more information on digital signatures. In section 2.3.2, 
digital signatures have been discussed in detail. 
• Authentication Exchange: A mechanism used to ensure the identity of an entity 
by swapping data. 
• Notarization: A mechanism in which a trusted third party is used in order to 
provide particular aspects of data exchange. 
Security mechanisms are further depicted in section 2.2. 
2.2 Overview of Cryptography 
 Millions of people using insecure-media for communication, such as the internet, 
require privacy and security. Cryptography is a tool that provides privacy and security. 
The word cryptography means the study of secret writing. In history, cryptography has 
been used for military applications in order to prevent the capture of sensitive 
information by enemies. Nowadays, advanced cryptography techniques are used as 
security mechanisms in order to provide secure electronic communication for civil or 
military applications.  
 Figure 1 shows the basic secure communication model used in cryptography. The 
secure communication model consists of three entities: Alice, Bob, and Mallory. In this 
scenario, Alice has a secret message or plaintext that she wants to send to Bob through 
an insecure channel and Mallory is a malicious user that wants to read Alice’s messages 
to Bob. Alice encrypts her plaintext with an encryption key that both Bob and Alice 
have previously agreed on. The encrypted plaintext is called ciphertext, which is data 
not readily intelligible. Alice sends this ciphertext to Bob through an insecure channel 
in which the malicious user Mallory eavesdrops on the channel to get the packets sent 
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by Alice. Even though Mallory may know the encryption/decryption algorithm used, 
without knowing the correct decryption key he cannot correctly decrypt the ciphertext. 
On the other hand, Bob receiving the ciphertext has the decryption key. Bob decrypts 
correctly the ciphertext and obtains the original plaintext created by Alice. Therefore, 
privacy of the plaintext is provided by means of encryption and decryption. 
 
Figure 1. Basic Cryptographic Communication Model 
 There are mainly two types of approach: Symmetric Cryptography and 
Asymmetric Cryptography [1]. Asymmetric cryptography is sometimes called Public 
Key Cryptography. 
2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography 
 Symmetric cryptography, which is also known as classical, conventional, private-
key, single-key cryptography, is the traditional one. In symmetric cryptography, both 
encryption and decryption algorithm use the same key. Other than 
encryption/decryption, symmetric cryptography can be used to provide authentication 
and integrity services by using Message Authentication Codes (MAC) [1] or Hash 
Based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC) [1]. 
Alice Encryption plaintext 
Encryption Key 
Decryption 
Decryption Key 
ciphertext Bob plaintext 
Malory 
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Figure 2. Symmetric Cryptography Communication Model 
 
 Figure 2 shows a typical communication model with symmetric cryptography. 
Alice wants to send a plaintext message to Bob while providing privacy. Alice encrypts 
her message using an encryption algorithm with a symmetric secret key. Subsequently, 
Alice sends the encrypted message, the ciphertext, to Bob. Bob receiving the ciphertext 
decrypts this message with the symmetric secret key that Alice has used for encrypting 
the message.  
  
 The encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm are mathematically related 
such that the decryption algorithm does inverse operations of the encryption algorithm 
if the same symmetric key is used on both algorithms. 
 
 As it can easily be seen from the Symmetric Cryptography Communication 
Model, the two communicating parties must have previously exchanged the symmetric 
secret key through a secure channel. Therefore, symmetric cryptography has the 
problem of key distribution or management. 
  
Alice Encryption plaintext 
Secret Key 
Decryption 
Secret Key 
ciphertext Bob plaintext 
Secure 
Channel 
Insecure 
Channel 
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 Some symmetric cryptography algorithms are the Rijndael (AES) [20], the 
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [21], RC6 and RC5 [22] and the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [23]. 
2.2.2 Asymmetric Cryptography 
 In symmetric cryptography, the sender and the receiver must agree on a secret key 
before communication starts. This problem of key agreement or management leads to 
the invention of asymmetric cryptography in other words public-key cryptography. 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman invented this new concept asymmetric 
cryptography [24] in 1976.  
 Asymmetric cryptography is used to provide digital signatures, 
encryption/decryption and key exchange functionality. Table 1 shows some asymmetric 
cryptosystem comparisons for their functionality. 
Table 1. Asymmetric Cryptosystems Functionality 
Algorithm Encryption/Decryption Digital Signature Key Exchange 
RSA Yes Yes Yes 
Elliptic-Curve Yes (Rarely Used) Yes Yes 
Diffie-Helman No No Yes 
DSS No Yes No 
ElGamal Yes Yes No 
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 In asymmetric cryptography systems, two keys are used: public-key and private-
key. Public-keys may be known by anybody. Public-keys may be used in order to 
encrypt messages, to verify digital signatures (detailed explanations on digital 
signatures may be found in Section 2.3.2), and to exchange secret keys.  
 A private-key is only known by its owner. Private-keys are usually used to 
decrypt messages and to sign (create) digital signatures. Public-keys and the private-
keys are mathematically related to each other; however, it is not feasible to derive a 
private key from a public key. It is computationally easy to encrypt/decrypt messages 
when the relevant keys are known. Figure 3 shows the usage of asymmetric keys. 
ciphertext = EKU(plaintext), easy to compute  when KU and plaintext are known 
plaintext = DKR(ciphertext) , easy to compute  when KR and ciphertext are known 
E : Encryption algorithm 
D: Decryption algorithm 
KU: Public Key 
KR: Private Key 
Figure 3. Usage of Asymmetric Keys 
  
 A typical asymmetric-key encryption/decryption model is shown in Figure 4. 
First, Alice encrypts her plaintext message with Bob’s freely accessible public key and 
sends the encrypted message (ciphertext) to Bob. Bob receiving this ciphertext decrypts 
it using his private key and obtains the original plaintext. Since no one except Bob owns 
Bob’s private key, only Bob can correctly decrypt this message and obtain the original 
plaintext. 
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Figure 4. Asymmetric Encryption/Decryption Model 
 
 Figure 5 shows how authentication is achieved using asymmetric cryptosystems. 
Alice encrypts a plaintext message with her private key and sends the ciphertext to Bob. 
Bob receiving this encrypted message decrypts it with Alice’s public key. Since, Alice’s 
public key is known publicly, anyone who captures Alice’s ciphertext message may 
decrypt it and therefore read the original plaintext. Consequently, this scheme does not 
provide confidentiality, but provides authentication. Since, Alice’s private key is only 
known by Alice, no one other than Alice could create this ciphertext. Therefore, when 
Bob decrypts this ciphertext with Alice’s public key and obtains an intelligible message, 
Bob authenticates Alice’s message. 
 
 
Figure 5. Authentication with Asymmetric Cryptosystems 
 
 As it can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, public and private keys are used such that 
if one is used for encryption the other is used for decryption.  
Alice Encryption plaintext 
Bob’s Public Key 
Decryption 
Bob’s Private Key 
ciphertext Bob plaintext 
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 Asymmetric cryptography is much slower than symmetric cryptosystems. For this 
reason, asymmetric cryptosystems should not be used for encrypting large amounts of 
data. Asymmetric cryptography does not replace symmetric cryptography and it is not 
considered more secure than symmetric cryptography. Furthermore, key distribution in 
asymmetric cryptography is not trivial since making keys public is also a hard problem. 
Therefore, key distribution is easier but not trivial. 
 
 The most popular public key cryptosystem is RSA [25]. Elliptic Curve [26], 
ElGamal [27], Diffie-Helman [24] and Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [33] are other 
widely used public-key cryptosystems. Moreover, comparisons of several asymmetric 
cryptosystems may be found in [28]. 
 
2.2.2.1 An RSA Example 
 In this section an example of an asymmetric cryptosystem, RSA is presented. 
1. Two unequal prime number p and q are randomly selected: 
p = 47 
q = 73 
2. The product of p and q is calculated: 
n = p * q = 3431 
3. Euler totient Ø of the two primes p and q is calculated: 
Ø = ( p – 1 ) * (q - 1) = 3312 
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4. A number e is randomly selected such that 1 < e < n and gcd (e , Ø) = 1 
e = 425 
5. The modular inverse of e is calculated 
d = e-1 mod Ø = 1769 
6. Private-key = { d  } and public-key = {e , n} 
7. Assume plaintext is represented as a number 
m = 707 
8. Encryption operation is computed as follows: c = m e (mod n) 
ciphertext = c =  707 425 (mod 3431) = 2142 
9. Decryption operation is computed as follows: m = c d (mod n) 
plaintext = m = 2142 1769 (mod 3431) = 707 
2.2.3 Hash Functions 
 Hash functions are one-way functions that get variable size input and produce fix 
size small output, which are also called message digests. Given the digest, it must be 
computationally infeasible to find the original message. Furthermore, hash functions 
must be collision resistant; finding out two messages that produce the same hash result 
must be impractical. Some of the most commonly used hash functions are Message 
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Digest-5 (MD5) [29] and Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA1) [1]. MD5 produces 128-bit 
digest, SHA-1 produces 160-bit digest. 
2.2.4 Hash Based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC) 
 HMAC [1, 12] is a technique that uses a secret key to generate a small fixed-size 
block of data from arbitrary large messages. HMAC is not necessarily reversible. A 
secret key must be shared between the sender and receiver. HMAC is also called 
cryptographic checksum and is usually appended at the end of a message. The receiver 
of this message usually performs the same HMAC operation on the message and 
compares the result to the senders HMAC value. This way the receiver gets assurance 
that a message has not been altered during transmission and further, the receiver 
authenticates the sender of this message. However, HMAC is not a signature since both 
the receiver and the sender can generate the same HMAC. Furthermore, by knowing a 
message and its HMAC value, it should be computationally infeasible to find another 
message with same HMAC value. 
2.3 Cryptographic Solutions to Security Problems 
 In this section, cryptographic solutions to some security problems are discussed. 
The problem of confidentiality, integrity, digital signatures, and digital envelopes are 
discussed. 
2.3.1 Confidentiality with Symmetric Encryption 
 Using symmetric encryption is one of the most frequently used methods for 
providing confidentiality. Two entities that have previously agreed on a secret key can 
provide confidentiality of their messages by using symmetric encryption. If an 
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adversary intercepts the encrypted messages, he/she cannot restore it without knowing 
the correct symmetric key. Therefore, each entity receiving a message can be assured 
that the message is sent in a confidential way. 
2.3.2 Authentication and Integrity with Digital Signatures 
 Digital signature [25, 32, 33, and 34] is a mechanism for non-repudiation, 
authentication, and integrity. The basic idea behind digital signature is to use the private 
key on the message to produce a piece of information that can only be produced by a 
single entity. Furthermore, this signature can be verified by decryption with the public-
key; as a result, the verification can be carried out by anybody. Generally, digital 
signatures are produced and verified over hash of the message in order to provide 
integrity. 
 
Figure 6. Digital Signature Model Based on RSA 
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 Figure 6 shows RSA digital signature model [25] in which two entities Alice and 
Bob communicate. In this communication, digital signatures are used in order to 
provide authentication and integrity. First, Alice generates a message M; second, she 
produces the hash value of the message H(M); and third, she encrypts this hash value 
with her private key as follows: E
AKR
(H(M)). Finally, she sends the signature 
E
AKR
(H(M)) to Bob together with the original message M. Bob receiving the message 
M and the signature E
AKR
(H(M)), first generates the hash of the message M. Second, he 
decrypts the signature with Alice’s public key and obtains the digest of the message M 
as follows: D
AKU
(E
AKR
(H(M) )) = H(M). If the digests obtained by Bob in the first two 
steps are equal, Bob can be sure that message M is produced by Alice and that the 
contents of the message have not been altered. 
2.3.3 Digital Envelopes 
 Digital Enveloping [1, 12] is a nice solution for fast message exchanging, which 
uses the speed of symmetric cryptography and security of asymmetric cryptography. A 
digital envelope has two parts: a message encrypted with a symmetric session key, and 
the symmetric session key encrypted with the public-key of the recipient. 
 
 Figure 7 shows a typical digital enveloping mechanism. In this figure, there are 
two entities: Alice and Bob. Alice wants to send a confidential message M to Bob. Alice 
has Bob’s public-key KUB. Alice, does not want to encrypt whole message with Bob’s 
public key since public key encryption is slow so Alice encrypts a randomly generated 
symmetric session key KS with Bob’s public-key as follows: E
BKU
(KS). Subsequently, 
Alice encrypts her message M with symmetric session key KS is done in the following 
way: EKS(M). Lastly, Alice sends the encrypted session key E BKU (KS) and the 
encrypted message EKS(M) to Bob. Having received these two fields, Bob first, decrypts 
the session key with his private key as shown below: D
BKR
(E
BKU
(KS)) = KS. Second, 
Bob decrypts the message using the symmetric session key KS, obtained in the previous 
step as in the following manner: DKS(EKS(M)) = M.  
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 Digital Enveloping is a mechanism that improves the performance of key 
exchange by joining the strengths of symmetric cryptography and asymmetric 
cryptography. 
 
Figure 7. Digital Enveloping 
 
 
  20 
 
3 RELATED WORK 
 Assume that there exist two entities that has some electronic good the other one 
wants. A fair exchange protocol is a protocol guaranteeing that either both entities get 
what they want, or neither of them gets anything. 
 In the literature, exchange protocols, contract-signing protocols, digital certified 
mail protocols, and e-commerce protocols try to solve similar problems. The difference 
between these protocols is the content of the exchanged items. Some details related to 
these protocols are found below. 
3.1 Exchange Protocols  
 In Exchange Protocols, two entities want to exchange arbitrary electronic items. 
These items may be e-money, digital signatures, receipt of mails or any kind of e-goods. 
Exchange protocols, contract-signing protocols, digital certified protocols and e-
commerce protocols can be categorized using two different approaches: protocols using 
trusted third parties and baby-step protocols [12].  
3.1.1 Protocol Using Trusted Third Parties 
 In protocols that use trusted third parties, two entities want to perform an 
exchange by means of a trusted third party. These protocols have two approaches: 
online trusted third party protocols and optimistic protocols.  
  21 
3.1.1.1 Online Trusted Third Party Protocols 
 In protocols with online trusted third parties, both entities send their items to the 
trusted third party that makes the exchange by sending the appropriate item to the 
appropriate entity. However, this approach has some drawbacks:   
• Cost: Online trusted third parties must always be available. Thus, they must 
maintain a bandwidth capable of handling enormous traffic. 
• Congestion: Several messages are routed to and from the online trusted third 
party, which may create a major bottleneck in the network.  
• Liability: Trusted third party is actually a single point of failure. A possible 
crash causes disastrous consequences. Trusted third parties require costly 
precautions that require large operating costs.  
Some protocols with online trusted third parties may be found in [3, 5, 9, 14, and 15].   
3.1.1.2 Optimistic Protocols 
  The second approach using trusted third parties is called optimistic 
protocols. In optimistic protocols, trusted third parties do not participate in the protocol 
if both entities are honest. Therefore, with optimistic protocols, congestion and costs are 
minimized. If one of the entities does not get its item while the other does, this unjust 
situation is reported to the trusted third party and the trusted third party solves this 
problem within the protocol. The trusted third party does not need to store any secret of 
any party or to store anything about an exchange after helping the unjustly treated side. 
Some optimistic protocols may be found in [4, 7, 8, 9 and 19]. Failure analysis of [7] 
may be found in [10 and 11]. 
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3.1.2 Baby-Step Protocols 
 Baby-step protocols are exchange protocols without trusted third parties, where 
the probability of protocol completion is gradually increased over several cycles. It is 
better to explain baby-step protocol concept using an example. Assume that Alice and 
Carol want to exchange their signature on a contract. Firstly, Alice writes the first 
character “A” of her name on the contract and sends it to Carol. Carol receiving the 
contract with the first character of Alice’s name writes the first character “C” of her 
name on the contract and sends it back to Alice. Alice receiving the contract adds the 
second character of her name “Al” to the contract. These sequences of events continue 
until each entity signs their complete name on the contract; hence, they approach the 
solution with baby steps.  
 These types of protocols have a disadvantage: Stopping the protocol before 
completion may result in a situation where one of the entities is closer to the solution. 
For example, assume that the contract has “Ali” and “Ca” as signature on it. Carol is 
closer to the solution. Moreover, assume that these signatures are digital signatures and 
that Carol tries a brute force attack to obtain Alice’s complete signature on the contract. 
Carol has a one-step advantage to perform a brute force attack as compared to Alice’s 
chance to do it. Carol may successfully complete the brute force attack and she may 
create an asymmetric situation where Alice is bound to the contract but Carol is not. 
This situation is contradictory to the fairness property and is a serious breach of 
security. Even if Carol and Alice have signed the same amount of characters, Carol may 
have much greater computation power than Alice and therefore she may be closer to the 
solution. Consequently, equal computation power cannot be assumed.   
 Although it seems like exchange protocols with trusted third parties are better 
solutions than the baby-step approach (exchange protocols without trusted third parties), 
sometimes baby-step approach may be better suited due to different security 
requirements and because sometimes problems require a peer-to-peer approach rather 
than a client-server approach. For example, consider a multimedia exchange protocol 
similar to Kazaa [16] or Napster [17] is designed. Kazaa and Napster are peer-to-peer 
multimedia exchange programs that do not display the fairness property. In these types 
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of systems, several clients communicate with each other in order to download 
multimedia files.  
 One of the most important features of a fair multimedia or even a general 
exchange protocol is to check the quality of the exchanged products. Assume that Alice 
and Bob want to exchange some movies using a fair multimedia exchange protocol. 
Alice claims that she has Movie A and Bob claims that he has Movie B. If there is no 
quality control in the protocol, Alice may create some dummy file, rename this dummy 
file as Movie A, and send this file to Bob using the protocol. At the end of the protocol, 
Bob will realize that although he and Alice have fairly exchanged some data, the quality 
of the data exchanged is not as Alice has claimed. This example shows that, fair 
multimedia exchange protocols must provide a quality control mechanism. Furthermore, 
this quality control mechanism requires human inspection; i.e. understanding whether a 
movie file named Movie A is really Movie A. The quality control in a fair multimedia 
exchange protocol can be performed by a trusted third party or by client entities. If the 
protocol is designed to be scalable as Kazaa and Napster, it is not possible for the 
trusted third party to verify the quality of each exchanged multimedia file. There are too 
many files for human inspection at a centralized server. For this reason, the quality 
control mechanism of fair multimedia exchange protocols must be set in motion by the 
client entities; each client must decide for itself whether the claimed goods are 
consistent with the actual goods.  
 Multimedia exchange protocols in which client entities perform quality control 
can be implemented with the baby-step approach (exchange protocols without trusted 
third parties). For example, Alice will send some sub part of Movie A to Bob. Bob 
receiving this sub part of a movie file will watch it and decide whether this is truly some 
subpart of Movie A. If so, Bob will send some sub part of Movie B to Alice, and so on. 
If neither of the entities stops the protocol early, each entity will end up with a complete 
movie. If either part stops the protocol early, both entities will be able to watch 
approximately the same amount of movie but not the entire movie.  
 The security needs of a multimedia exchange protocol are much less than the 
security needs of an e-commerce protocol, since in e-commerce protocols the 
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exchanged items are money and e-goods; however, in multimedia exchange protocols 
the exchanged items may be video or audio files. Furthermore, the definition of fairness 
has a different meaning: two entities that want to perform exchange both obtain either 
the complete items they want or approximately the same amount of data from the item. 
Some baby-step approach protocols may be found in [12 and 13]. In [6], there is some 
work on comparisons of different types of exchange protocols. 
3.2 Simultaneous Contract Signing Protocols 
 In simultaneous contract signing protocols, two entities want to exchange digital 
signatures on a contract simultaneously. Neither entity wants to send its signature before 
receiving the other entity’s signature since the other entity could vanish after receiving a 
signature. This problem is similar to e-commerce protocols, since instead of exchanging 
e-money with an e-product, signatures are exchanged between entities. Some 
simultaneous contract signing protocols may be found in [2, 4, 5, 12, 13 and 19].  
3.3 Digital Certified Mail Protocols 
 In digital certified mail protocols, two parties are involved. The first party Alice 
wants to send a message to the second party Bob, but she does not want him to read it 
without signing a receipt. Therefore, Alice wants to exchange her message with Bob’s 
signature on this message. This situation is similar to a conventional mailing system 
where a mail carrier brings a letter to a destination address. The mail carrier will not 
deliver the mail until obtaining the signature of the property owner. Digital certified 
mail protocols are similar to the problem in general exchange and contract signing 
protocols, only the content of exchanged items differs. Some digital certified mail 
protocols may be found in [4, 13 and 19]. 
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3.4 E-Commerce Protocols 
 Two entities are involved in an e-commerce transaction: a customer and a 
merchant. The merchant provides some service or transmits some e-goods in response 
to a customer’s e-money.  Some e-commerce protocols may be found in [6, 7, 8, 9, 14 
and 15]. Furthermore, failure analysis of some e-commerce protocols can be found in 
[10 and 11]. 
 In [4], Silvio Micali proposed several optimistic protocols for certified mail 
applications and for contract signing applications in which two entities, Alice and Bob, 
are involved. These two types of protocols guarantee, respectively, a fair exchange of 
mail in return for a receipt or exchange of digital signatures. Therefore, either both 
Alice and Bob will get what they want, or neither of them will receive anything. 
Furthermore, both of these protocols are enhanced by guaranteeing the termination of 
the protocol at a given cut-off time. 
 Figure 8 shows one of Micali’s proposed protocols “An Optimistic Protocol for 
Fair Certified E-mail”.  In certified e-mail protocols, e-mail messages are exchanged for 
their receipts. In the proposed protocol, Alice (A) exchanges her e-mail message M in 
return for Bob’s (B’s) receipt. In the first message of the protocol, Alice sends Bob an 
e-mail message M, her identity information A, and Bob’s identity information B, all 
encrypted with the trusted third party’s public-key. Bob receiving this message cannot 
read the contents since he lacks the correct decryption key (third party’s private key 
KRTP). Subsequently, in the second message, Bob sends the receipt of the e-mail, 
which is actually Bob’s signature over the first message Z ( SIGB( Z ) ). Alice receiving 
the second message checks the validity of Bob’s signature; if valid Alice sends the e-
mail message M in the third message. If both parties behave honestly, after this step, the 
protocol is completed since both parties have obtained the items they expected. M 
received as part of the first message must be equal to M received in the third message. 
In order to check this equality, Bob performs the encryption EKUTP(A,B,M) using the 
value M obtained from the third message and compares the result with the first message. 
If these two values are not equal, Bob concludes that Alice has cheated and therefore he 
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applies to the trusted third party for dispute resolution. In the fourth message, Bob sends 
Z and the e-mail receipt SIGB( Z ) to the trusted third party. The trusted third party 
receiving this message checks the validity of Bob’s signature. If valid, the third party 
resolves this dispute by sending the appropriate item to the appropriate entity; in other 
words, the third party sends the e-mail receipt SIGB( Z ) to Alice and the e-mail 
message M to Bob. However, in order to do so, the trusted third party first has to 
retreive the e-mail message from Z by performing the following decryption: DKRTP(Z) = 
= (A, B, M). 
1. A Î B: Z = EKUTP(A,B,M) 
2. B Î A: SIGB( Z ) 
If  ( SIGB( Z ) is correct ) 
 3. A Î B: M 
If  EKUTP(A, B, M) ! = Z  
  4.   BÎTP: Z, SIGB( Z )         
 If  ( SIGB( Z ) is correct )  
   5. TPÎA: SIGB( Z ) 
   6. TPÎB: M 
Symbol Meaning 
A Alice 
B Bob 
TP  Trusted third party 
KUTP Public-Key of TP 
KRTP  Private-Key of TP 
M Mail Message 
AÎB: X A sends X to B 
EKUTP ( X ) Assymetric Encryption of X using the key KUTP 
DKRTP ( X )  Assymetric Decryption of X using the key KRTP 
SIGB(X) B’s digital signature on X 
Figure 8. An Optimistic Protocol for Fair Certified E-mail  
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3.4.1 Desired Properties of E-commerce Protocols 
Some desired properties of e-commerce protocols have been stated below: 
 
1. The protocol must be fair. Assume that a merchant has e-products to sell 
and that a client has e-money. The protocol must have two possible 
outcomes: 
 
• Either, the client obtains the e-product and the merchant obtains 
the e-money, or 
• Both entities obtain nothing. 
 
2. The protocol must not assume that entities have equal knowledge of 
protocol and equal computation power. 
 
3. The trusted third party will not participate in any execution in which the 
merchant and the customer are honest. If the customer pays but does not 
get any e-products then he/she will prove this injustice to the trusted 
third party and the customer will get the e-products from the trusted 
third party. This property of keeping the trusted third party out of normal 
execution avoids congestion at the trusted third party with a minimum 
cost. 
 
4. Messages within the dispute resolution protocol must be minimized. It 
must be simple and therefore fast.  
 
5. E-goods must be transferred only once per protocol run. In most of the 
previous e-commerce protocols proposed in the literature [3, 7, 8, 9, 15 
and 19], it is assumed that the merchant’s e-goods are small. These 
protocols transfer e-goods multiple times in order to establish dispute 
resolution. This situation may be excessively costly if the e-good size is 
large. An example to a large e-good is a movie file.  
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6. Disputes must be resolved within the protocol, not by gathering 
evidence and taking them to a court.  
 
7. The trusted third party must not store any secrets, e-goods or protocol 
messages (i.e. In [7] both TP and Merchant stored copies of the e-
goods). 
 
8. Clients must be anonymous. Anonymity provides that the identity of an 
entity will not be revealed during an e-commerce transaction. This is 
especially significant for customers who do not want the merchant to 
discover their patterns of shopping habits. 
 
9. Quality control of the e-products must be provided. The protocol must 
guarantee that the e-product contents and prices are as the merchant has 
claimed them to be. Either a customer may perform the quality control 
for his/her self or the trusted third party may perform it. 
 
Table 2 shows comparison of several protocols for their desired properties 
according to the descriptions stated above. If a protocol provides a certain 
property, the symbol “√” is used. If not, the symbol “X” is used. If a property 
cannot be evaluated using a certain protocol, the symbol “N” (standing for: not 
applicable) is used. Finally, “[*]” is the proposed optimistic fair e-commerce 
protocol. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Several E-Commerce Protocols 
  Desired Properties of e-
commerce Protocols 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
[3]  √ √ X N X √ √ √ X 
[4] √ √ √ √ N √ √ √ N 
[7] √ √ √ X X √ √ X √ 
[8] √ √ X X X √ √ √ √ 
[9] √ √ X N X √ X √ √ 
[13] X X √ N √ X N √ X 
[14] √ √ X √ √ X √ X X 
[15] √ √ X N X N √ √ √ 
[19] X √ √ X X X √ X X 
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
s 
[*] √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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4 DESIGN OF FAIR E-COMMERCE PROTOCOL 
 In this section, this researcher proposes an optimistic fair e-commerce protocol. 
First, assumptions are presented. Third, preliminary concepts, chain keys and offline 
certification, are described. Finally, the proposed protocol is described. 
4.1  Assumptions 
 Assumptions for the proposed protocol are as follows: 
 
• The public keys of each player are securely distributed before the 
protocol run. 
 
• The customer has already browsed the merchant’s web page and 
selected the item to be purchased before the protocol run. 
 
• The merchant and the trusted third party accept tokens (see Section 4.2 
for details) as a valid payment method and both can verify whether a 
token is valid (whether the claimed credit card number exists and has 
enough money in the account) or not. The merchant contacts a bank 
entity in order to verify a token. The token is assumed to have the 
format of the Purchase Request Message in Secure Electronic 
Transaction (SET) [1], which is a world wide standard for payment 
tokens. These types of tokens are idempotent; in other words processing 
the same token multiple times does not mean that the amount of money 
to be transferred will also multiply. 
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• Before the protocol starts, the trusted third party certifies each product 
in terms of its price, description, and contents (See Section 4.4 for 
details).  
 
• The integrity and authentication of each message is provided by 
appending the digital signature of that message. For the sake of 
simplicity, these signatures are not shown in the protocol.  
 
• Encryptions are strong enough so that it is not possible to decrypt a 
message without the correct decryption key. 
 
• Bank entities that are involved in the payment procedure (see Section 
4.2 for details) and the third party are assumed to be trustworthy. 
 
• Communication between the trusted third party and the other players 
can be delayed by an arbitrary, but finite amount of time by an attacker. 
However, the trusted third party will eventually receive messages. 
 
• An attacker may gain complete control of the communications between 
the merchant and the customer. In other words, the attacker may 
prevent the customer from sending messages to the merchant and visa 
versa for an indefinite period. 
 
• Communication failures between the customer and the merchant are 
considered as misbehavior of an entity and therefore dispute resolution 
commences. In other words if for any reason the communication 
between the customer and the merchant is disrupted, the client will 
assume that the merchant is cheating and therefore, the client will apply 
to the third party for dispute resolution. 
 
• Each of the players is able to compute and verify digital signatures and 
to compute collision resistant one-way hash functions. More 
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information regarding digital signatures and hash functions may be 
found in [18, 25, 32, 33, and 34], Section 2.3.2 and in Section 2.2.3. 
4.2 The Payment Token 
 Figure 9 shows the payment token which has the SET [1] Purchase Request 
Message format. The PI field (payment information field) contains customer’s credit 
card number, destination account identifier and amount of money to be transferred. The 
PI field is intended to be processed only by the bank entity. The OI field (order 
information field) contains details of e-products such as a product identifier number, 
description string of the e-product and price of the product. The OI field is intended to 
be processed only by the merchant entity. The PI and OI fields are linked together in 
special technique called Dual Signature [1].  
 Stallings [1] discusses the function of dual signatures in the purchase request 
message. He states that dual signatures serve as a link between two messages that are 
anticipated for two different recipients. In the proposed protocol, the customer intends 
to transmit the OI to the merchant and the PI to the bank entity. The merchant has no 
need to know the customer’s credit card information and the bank does not need to 
know the customer’s order information. The customer must provide further protection 
in order to keep these two items separate while providing privacy. On the other hand, 
the OI and PI must be linked for dispute resolution if required. This link is essential to 
enable the customer to prove that a certain payment is for a certain order and not for 
some other orders. In order to understand the necessity for this link, take the case of the 
customer who transmits two messages, a signed OI and a signed PI, to the merchant, 
who then passes the PI to the bank entity. If this merchant acquires another OI from this 
customer, the merchant could argue that this OI is intended for the PI instead of the 
original OI. A dual signature prevents this situation. 
 Stallings [1] goes on to argue that in order to create a dual signature the customer 
gets the hash of the PI and the hash of the OI. Subsequently, these two digests are 
concatenated and the hash of the result is obtained. In the final step, the dual signature is 
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formed by encrypting the final digest with the customers private key, KRC, as follows: 
DS = EKRC( H( PI ) || H( OI ) ). Assume that the merchant has received a dual signature 
(DS), an OI, the message digest of a PI (PIMD) and the customer’s public-key. The 
merchant calculates these two values: H( PIMD || H( OI ) ) and DKUC( DS ). The bank 
entity has verified the signature if these two quantities are equal.  
 Stallings [1] also exemplifies the security of dual signatures. In the example case, 
the merchant wants to replace the legitimate OI with another OI in this transaction to 
benefit himself/herself. The merchant then has to create another OI whose hash 
corresponds to the existing OIMD. When secure hash functions are used, this is a costly 
process. Thus, the merchant is unable to link another OI with this PI. 
 Note that the Digital Envelopes [1, 12] (see Section 2.3.3 for details) are used in 
order to prevent asymmetric bulk encryption of PI, dual signature and OIMD. 
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Figure 9. SET Purchase Request Message 
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4.3 Chain Keys 
 In the proposed protocol for each purchase of a product, one symmetric key 
will expended. In order to reduce the total numbers of keys to be stored, the third 
party will generate the n session keys KSi=1..n with a special method called Chain 
Keys , which is a concept introduced in [38].  
 
 Figure 10 shows the steps involved in producing chain keys. First, the third 
party generates a random symmetric session key called the Root Key or in other 
words KS1. Second, the third party computes the HMAC [1, 12] (See Section 
2.2.4 for details) of the Root Key using a key, HMAC Key, and obtains the second 
key of the chain, which is KS2. Third, the third party computes the HMAC of KS2 
again using the same HMAC Key and obtains KS3. This process continues until 
all keys (KSi=1..n) are produced. The aim of this method is to generate multiple 
keys derived the Root Key and a single HMAC key.  
 
 
Figure 10. Chain Key Production 
4.4 The Offline Certification Process 
 Before the protocol runs, an offline certification process is employed in order 
to certify each product in terms of its price, description, and contents. In the 
offline certification process, the merchant demands n certificates from the trusted 
third party for a certain e-product.   
 
RootKey=KS1 HMAC 
HMAC Key 
KS2 HMAC 
HMAC Key 
KS3 HMAC 
HMAC Key 
KS4 
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 Figure 11 shows the product certificate format. The first field in the certificate 
is the hash of the encrypted e-product. This field is employed in order to certify 
the contents of the product. The encryption is performed with a symmetric session 
key KSi. This symmetric session key is produced with a special method; Chain 
Keys (see Section 4.3 for details). In this method a chain of keys are produced 
using two keys RootKey and HMAC Key. The HMAC and the RootKey key must 
be known by the entities that will generate the chain key. Therefore, they must be 
known by both the merchant and the third party. Each one of the n certificates of a 
certain e-product will contain a different hash value of the encrypted product since 
the product will be encrypted with a different session key in each copy. The 
second field is a numeric value indicating the price of the product. The third field 
is a string that describes the product. The fourth field is a unique identifier for 
each product. The fifth field is the chain key index. The last field is the signature 
of the trusted third party on the previous fields of the certificate. 
 
 In order to resolve disputes the third party does not have to save the copies of 
the certificates but has to save a Root Key and a HMAC Key per product (See 
Section 4.5 for details). At the end of this offline certification process, the trusted 
third party will send the n certificates, the Root Key and the HMAC Key to the 
merchant through a secure channel. 
 
 
Figure 11. Product Certificate Format 
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4.5 The Protocol Description 
 Figure 12 shows the steps involved in the protocol. The integrity and 
authentication of each message of the protocol is provided by appending the 
digital signature of that message. For the sake of simplicity, these signatures are 
not shown in the protocol.  
 
 The protocol starts with the merchant sending the encrypted e-good and the 
certificate of that product. The customer receiving this message wants to be sure 
that he/she is really buying the product that the merchant has promised and that 
the merchant has not changed the price or contents. In order to do so, the client 
will check the certificate for the Price and Description fields. If satisfied, the 
encrypted product is hashed and compared to the first field of the certificate. If 
these two digests (hash values) are equal, then the customer is sure that the 
merchant is providing the correct product. Knowing that the merchant is not 
cheating, the client sends the token to the merchant in the second message. 
Subsequently, the merchant checks the validity of this token. If the token is valid, 
the merchant sends the product decryption key KSi encrypted with public-key of 
the customer in the third message. The customer receiving this encrypted product 
decryption key decrypts it using it private key as follows: DKRC( EKUC( KSi ) ) = = 
KSi. Subsequently, the customer acquires the e-good by decrypting the encrypted 
e-good using the product decryption key KSi as follows: D KS i ( E KS i ( E-good ) ) 
= = E-good. Up to this point the normal execution of the protocol is described, 
below the motive for dispute resolution is depicted.  
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CERTTP i =H(EKS i (E-good))||Price ||Description ||PID || i || Signature 
1) MÎC: E KS i (E-good) || CERTTP i  
2) CÎM: token 
3) MÎC: EKUC(KSi) 
 
Dispute Resolution Phase 
 
• Customer claims that he/she has not received Message 3  
 
4) CÎTP: token || i || PID || KUC 
5) TPÎC: EKUC(KSi) 
6) TPÎM: token || i || PID || KUC 
Symbol Meaning 
CERTTP i  i
th Certificate of a product signed by the trusted third party 
H(X) Hash of X 
EX (data) Encryption of data with key X 
E-good An e-product or electronic item such as, database or 
multimedia file 
Price Price of the e-good 
Description A string describing contents of the product 
KUX Public key of identity X 
KRX Private key of identity X 
SIGX(Data) 
Data signed by identity X; equivalent to EKR X  (H(Data)) 
TP Trusted third party 
M Merchant 
C Customer or Client 
|| Concatenation Operation 
PID Product Identifier 
Figure 12. Fair Optimistic E-Commerce Protocol Description 
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 Assume that the normal execution of the protocol runs and that the merchant 
sends the first message. After receiving the first message if the client does not 
send the second message the fairness property of the protocol is not violated. This 
fact is true since in the first message, the e-good is sent encrypted and therefore 
neither customer has received the e-good he/she expected nor did the merchant 
receive a token. However, if the customer sends the second message (token) in a 
legitimate way and the merchant does not reply with the encrypted product 
decryption key (third message) the fairness property is violated. This fact is true 
since, although the merchant has received the token the customer has not received 
the e-good he/she expected. In order to solve this problem the customer applies to 
the third party for dispute resolution. Below the dispute resolution phase is 
described. 
 
 Assume that the normal execution flows and that after the customer sends the 
token in the second message, the customer waits and does not get the product 
decryption key or it gets a wrong product decryption key. The customer applies to 
the trusted third party for dispute resolution. In the fourth message, the customer 
sends the token, the certificate index i, the product identifier PID and his/her 
public key to the trusted third party. In this message, the customer specifies the 
product decryption key he/she expects by sending the PID and i pair, since the 
PID specifies the product and i specifies the product decryption key corresponding 
to that PID. Furthermore, the third party must also obtain the token in this 
message. This fact is true since the third party is willing to perform the exchange 
by sending the appropriate item to the appropriate entity. It is important to 
remember that tokens are idempotent, therefore although the token may be 
processed two times the money transferred to the merchants account will not 
double (see Section 4.2 for details). Subsequently, the trusted third party checks 
the validity of the token. If the token is valid, in the fifth message the trusted third 
party sends the product decryption key related to the product identified by the PID 
and the chain key index i to the customer encrypted with the customers public 
key. The customer receiving this encrypted product decryption key decrypts it 
using it private key as follows: DKRC( EKUC( KSi ) ) = = KSi. Subsequently, the 
customer acquires the e-good by decrypting the encrypted e-good using the 
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product decryption key KSi as follows: D KS i ( E KS i ( E-good ) ) = = E-good. 
Finally, the merchant must be informed about this transaction. In order to do so, in 
the sixth message, the third party forwards the token and the purchased product 
information (fifth message) to the merchant. The merchant receiving this message 
processes the token and removes the ith certificate from its database. 
 
 A malicious user may try to spend the product decryption keys by skipping the 
normal execution of the protocol and by directly applying to the third party for 
dispute resolution. However, in order to do so the malicious user must send a 
legitimate token. In other words, the malicious user must pay in order to perform 
this attack. This attack is to the benefit of the merchant and is undesirably costly 
and infeasible for the attacker.  
 
 Another attack may be performed by a malicious user in order to create a 
bottleneck in the third party’s network. The attackers aim is to include the third 
party in the normal execution of the protocol and therefore to increase the traffic 
directed the third party. First, the attacker downloads the first message from the 
merchant. Second, the attacker skips the second and third messages and directly 
applies to the third party for dispute resolution. Subsequently, the attacker sends 
the fourth message in legitimate way; in other words, the token, i, and PID values 
are consistent with the first message and the customer’s public-key field is 
appropriate. This way, the third party is included in the normal execution of the 
protocol and traffic to the third party is increased. However, this attack is similar 
to the previous type of attack in that it also requires payment by the malicious user 
and benefits the merchant. Furthermore, the most costly operation is downloading 
the encrypted e-good (first message). The cost required to perform dispute 
resolution is much lower than the cost required for downloading the first message. 
In reality, in the proposed protocol, the merchant and customer exchange the 
product decryption key for the token (not the e-good for the token). Excluding the 
download operation of the encrypted e-good (which can be large) from the dispute 
resolution phase minimizes the damage of this attack.  
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5 DESIGN OF FAIR MULTIMEDIA EXCHANGE PROTOCOL 
 In this section, this researcher proposes a fair multimedia exchange protocol using 
a baby-step approach [12, 13] (see Section 3.1.2 for details). In a fair multimedia 
exchange protocol, there are large numbers of clients that communicate in order to 
barter fairly multimedia files in a peer-to-peer fashion. An important point to remember 
is the definition of fairness in baby-step protocols: two entities that want to perform 
exchange both obtain either the complete items they want or approximately the same 
amount of data from the item.  
 In a fair multimedia exchange protocol in addition to the problem of fair exchange 
the problem of quality control must be solved. In other words, entities involved in a 
transaction must verify claims of other untrustworthy entities using a quality control 
mechanism. This quality control mechanism requires human inspection; i.e. 
understanding whether a movie file named Movie A is in fact Movie A. The quality 
control in a fair multimedia exchange protocol can be performed by a trusted third party 
or by client entities. If the protocol is designed to be scalable, it is not possible for the 
trusted third party to verify the quality of each exchanged multimedia file. Trusted third 
parties may not have human inspection functions. For this reason, the quality control 
mechanism of fair multimedia exchange protocols must be set in motion by the client 
entities; each client must decide for itself whether the claimed goods are consistent with 
the actual goods. 
 In this section, first, assumptions are presented. Second, a preliminary process, 
which is the offline certification process, is presented. Lastly, the protocol is described. 
  42 
5.1 Assumptions 
The assumptions for the proposed protocol include the following: 
 
• There are two players in the protocol: Alice and Bob. 
 
• The public keys of Alice and Bob are securely exchanged before the 
protocol runs. 
 
• Before the protocol starts, both Alice and Bob have already decided 
on what multimedia files to exchange. 
 
• The integrity and authentication of each message is provided by 
appending the digital signature of that message. For the sake of 
simplicity, these signatures are not shown in the protocol.  
 
• Encryptions are strong enough so that it is not possible to decrypt a 
message without the correct decryption key. 
 
• An attacker may gain complete control of the communications 
between the entities involved in a transaction. In other words, the 
attacker may prevent messages to be sent for an indefinite period. 
 
• Communication failures are considered as misbehavior of an entity. 
 
• If for any reason the communication between the entities involved is 
disrupted, it is assumed that an entity is cheating. The protocol 
prevents violation of the fairness property. 
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5.2 Oblivious Transfer Protocol 
 The fair multimedia exchange protocol is based on the oblivious transfer 
protocol described in [12]. In the oblivious transfer protocol, an entity A sends 
two messages to another entity B. However, only one of the messages that entity 
A sends will be received by entity B. Furthermore, entity A will not know which 
one of these messages are received by entity B. An oblivious transfer protocol is 
similar to flipping a coin and showing the result to another person without 
learning what the outcome was. Below, an oblivious transfer protocol has been 
described. 
  
 Figure 13 shows steps involved in the oblivious transfer protocol. There are 
two players of the oblivious transfer protocol: Alice and Bob. Firstly, Alice 
generates two public/private key pairs KU1/KR1 and KU2/KR2 and sends the 
public keys KU1 and KU2 to Bob. Bob receiving the public keys chooses one of 
them, say KU1 and creates a symmetric key K. Subsequently, Bob encrypts the 
symmetric key K with the chosen public key KU1 and sends the result of 
encryption EKU1(K) back to Alice. Alice receiving this encryption does not know 
which one of her public keys was used for this encryption. Alice decrypts Bob’s 
keys twice with both of her private keys and obtains two keys. The result of one of 
these decryptions is the symmetric key K created by Bob: DKR1(EKU1(K)) = K and 
the other decryption is gibberish data that looks like a symmetric key: 
DKR2(EKU1(K)) = K_Wrong. Alice does not know which one is the original 
symmetric key created by Bob. Alice creates two messages msg1 and msg2. 
Subsequently, Alice encrypts these two messages with the symmetric keys K and 
K_Wrong in the following way: EK(msg1) and EK_Wrong(msg2) and sends them to 
Bob. Bob decrypts these messages with his symmetric key K as follows: 
DK(EK(msg1)) = msg1 and DK(EK_Wrong(msg2)) = msg_Wrong. Bob can read only 
one of these messages since the other cannot be decrypted correctly. Moreover, 
Alice does not know which message Bob can read.  
 
 The only way that Alice could cheat is to create both messages msg1 and msg2 
equal (msg1 = msg2). This way Alice would know what message Bob has 
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obtained, since both messages are the same. In order to prevent this situation, at 
the end of the protocol Alice must give her private keys KR1 and KR2 to Bob. 
Since Bob wants to discover the contents of msg1 and msg2 and since these two 
messages are contained in EK(msg1) and EK_Wrong(msg2), Bob must find the 
symmetric key K and K_Wrong. In order to find K and K_Wrong, Bob must 
perform the following decryptions, which require the private keys KR1 and KR2: 
DKR1(EKU1(K)) = K and DKR2(EKU1(K)) = K_Wrong. 
 
 
1. AÎB: KU1 || KU2 
2. BÎA: EKU1(K) 
3. AÎB: EK(msg1) || EK_Wrong(msg2) || KR1 || KR2 
 
Symbol Meaning 
A Alice 
B Bob 
AÎB: X A sends X to B 
KU Public-Key 
KR Private-Key 
|| Concatenation 
Operation 
EK(X) Encryption of X with 
key K 
Figure 13. Oblivious Transfer Protocol 
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5.3 The Protocol Description 
 Two entities Alice and Bob want to exchange their multimedia files. Alice has 
file A, and Bob has file B. In step one, both Alice and Bob divides their 
multimedia files into n pieces grouped as in Figure 14: 
 
1. Piece 1   Piece 2 
2. Piece 3   Piece 4 
               . . .                               . . . 
               . . .                               . . .  
               . . .                               . . . 
       n/2. Piece n-1           Piece n 
Figure 14. File Division 
  In step two, both Alice and Bob creates n symmetric keys grouped in pairs as 
in Figure 15. 
 
 
1. K1     K2 
2. K3     K4 
      . . .                                        . . . 
      . . .                                        . . . 
      . . .                                        . . . 
n/2. Kn-1                    Kn 
 
Figure 15. Creation and Grouping of n symmetric keys 
 
 In step three, both Alice and Bob encrypts their n pieces of files with their n 
symmetric keys as in Figure 16: 
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1. EK1(Piece 1)    EK2(Piece 2) 
2. EK3(Piece 3)    EK4(Piece 4) 
  . . .      . . . 
  . . .      . . . 
  . . .      . . . 
n/2. EKn-1(Piece n-1)    EKn(Piece n) 
 
Figure 16. Encryption of n Pieces of Files with n Symmetric Keys 
 
 In step four, both Alice and Bob sends each other their n encrypted messages. The 
integrity and authentication of each message of the protocol is provided by appending 
the digital signature of that message. For the sake of simplicity, these signatures are not 
shown in the protocol.  
 In step five, Alice and Bob send each other their symmetric key pairs using the 
oblivious transfer protocol. Among each key pair, only one will be received by both 
entities. Therefore, in total n/2 keys will be received by each side. Figure 17 shows an 
example of the first phase of this step in which Alice sends K1 and K2 through the 
Oblivious Transfer Protocol to Bob who receives K1. Subsequently, Bob sends K9 and 
K10 through the protocol in the same manner to Alice who receives K10. 
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Figure 17. Transmission of Keys Using Oblivious Transfer 
 In step six, Alice and Bob decrypts the pieces they can. There will be n/2 
decrypted pieces at each party. Each party will investigate the decrypted pieces and will 
decide whether these pieces are truly sub-parts of multimedia files A and B. If so, in 
step seven, both Alice and Bob will send each other the first bits of all n symmetric 
keys. Due to the oblivious transfer, n/2 bits of these bits have already been received; 
therefore, each party can check whether the other side is trying to cheat. Since both 
sides do not know which keys the other side has obtained among each pair of keys, the 
probability of cheating by sending wrong bits is 1/2(n/2). Therefore, the number of pairs 
has a direct relation with the probability that an entity cheats. The more pairs exist, the 
lower probability for an entity to cheat. Subsequently, Alice and Bob send the second 
bits of n symmetric keys, and this continues until all bits of all keys are sent. These bits 
sent can be encrypted if Alice and Bob decide to do so.  
 Lastly, both Alice and Bob decrypt the remaining n/2 pieces and obtain the 
complete multimedia file. 
1) K9 K10 
2) K11 K12 
3) K13 K14 
4) K15 K16 
1) K1  K2 
2) K3  K4 
3) K5  K6 
4) K7  K8 
Alice Bob 
Oblivious 
Transfer 
Protocol 
K1 K10 
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6 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
 The presented protocols are implemented with C# programming language using 
Microsoft Visual Studio .Net 2003 [35]. The implementation is tested on an Intel 
Celeron 1333 MHz computer with 240 MB RAM.  
6.1 Fair E-Commerce Protocol 
 The implementation consists of three modules: Client, Merchant, and Third Party. 
In the following sections, cryptographic methods, system requirements, deployment of 
system, and performance measurements of the implementation are described. 
6.1.1 Cryptographic Methods 
 The part below describes some important cryptographic methods deployed such as 
random symmetric key generator, initialization vector generator, rijndael 
encrypt/decrypt, rsa sign/verify, hash, HMAC and get key from key chain. 
6.1.1.1 Random Symmetric Key Generator 
 This method generates 128-bit random symmetric keys to be used for HMAC and 
Rijndael Encryption/Decryption operations. 
6.1.1.2 Initialization Vector Generator 
 This method generates random 128-bit initialization vectors for Rijndael 
Encryption/Decryption Operations. 
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6.1.1.3 Rijndael Encrypt/Decrypt 
 The Encrypt method performs Rijndael encryption. This method gets an input file 
name (name of the file to be encrypted), an output file name (encrypted file name), an 
initialization vector and a rijndael key as parameter.  
 The Decrypt method performs Rijndael decryption. This method gets an input file 
name (encrypted file name), an output file name (decrypted file name), an initialization 
vector and a rijndael key as parameter. 
6.1.1.4 RSA Sign/Verify 
 The method RSA Sign generates RSA signatures using SHA1 for 160-bit message 
digest generation. This method gets a private-key and the message to be signed as 
parameter. Furthermore, the signature is returned.  
 The method RSA Verify verifies RSA signatures using SHA1 for 160-bit message 
digest generation. This method gets a public-key, a message and signature of a message 
as parameter. Furthermore, this method returns true if the signature is verified, false if 
the signature is not verified. 
6.1.1.5 Hash 
 This method performs 128-bit md5 message digests. As parameter, this method 
gets the name of the file to be hashed and returns the 128-bit digest. 
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6.1.1.6 HMAC 
 This method performs 160-bit hash based message authentication code using 
SHA1 as a one-way hash function. This method gets a message, and a symmetric key as 
parameter. Furthermore, this method returns the 160-bit message authentication code. 
6.1.1.7 Get Key from Chain Key 
 This method gets a key from a chain key at a given index position according to the 
method described in Section 4.3. This method gets a RootKey, an HMAC key and an 
index value as parameter. Furthermore, this method returns the computed key from the 
chain key. 
6.1.2 Requirements 
 In order to run the programs, it is enough to have Microsoft .Net Framework 1.1 
[36] and Microsoft SQL Server 2000 [37]. The Merchant and Third Party programs 
must be run on a fast computer since these servers must be able to operate for a large 
number of clients and have database connectivity with a Microsoft SQL Server. The 
Client program does not require Microsoft SQL Server. 
 The merchant program connects to a Microsoft SQL Server table: Merchant. 
Table 3 shows the fields, descriptions and data types used in the merchant table.  
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Table 3. Merchant Table 
Field Name Description Data Type 
PID Product identifier Unique identifier 
Name Product File Name VarChar  
Description  
Description of the 
product 
VarChar 
Price  Price of the product Numeric 
Location  Product File Location VarChar 
LastUsedIndex  
Last used chain key 
index 
Numeric 
NoCertificates 
Total number of 
certificates 
Numeric 
  
 The third party program connects to a Microsoft SQL Server table; TP. Table 4 
shows the fields, descriptions, and data types used in the TP table. 
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Table 4. TP (Third Party) Table 
Field Name Description Data Type 
PID Product identifier Unique identifier 
Name Product File Name VarChar 
 
Description 
Description of the 
product 
VarChar 
Price Price of the product Numeric 
6.1.3 Deployment of the System 
 Implementation software is available at the project web page [30]. In order to use 
the project, the Client, Merchant, and Third Party programs must be downloaded. 
Microsoft .Net Framework 1.1 must be installed. Furthermore, Microsoft SQL Server 
must be installed on the computers that run Merchant and Third Party programs. 
Initially, the Trusted Third party program must be run in order to certify a product. 
Subsequently, the Merchant program must be run in order to register the certificate 
obtained in the previous step. Finally, the Client program may be run in order to start e-
commerce transactions. Client, Merchant, and Third Party programs all have a practical 
and easy use GUI. 
 In order to run the client program, firstly, some setting parameters such as 
merchant IP, merchant port, merchant search query port, merchant public-key filename, 
trusted third party IP, trusted third party dispute resolution port and trusted third party 
public key filename must be provided. These settings can be loaded either from a 
settings file or by manually typing them. After the settings are changed, the client 
program must be restarted for these new settings.  
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 In order to run the merchant program, some setting parameters such as the third 
party public-key filename, SQL data source, SQL initial catalog, SQL user name, SQL 
password, SMTP BCC, SMTP from, SMTP server address, SMTP server port, SMTP 
username, SMTP password, merchant port, merchant dispute resolution port, merchant 
search query port, merchant administrator e-mail address, merchant public-key 
filename, merchant private-key filename and IsTokenAlwaysValid field must be 
provided. These settings can be loaded either from a settings file or by manually typing 
them. After these settings are changed, the merchant program must be restarted for these 
new settings. 
 In order to run the third-party program, some setting parameters such as third-
party private key filename, third-party public key filename, third party server port, SQL 
data source, SQL initial catalog, SQL user name, SQL password, merchant public-key 
filename, merchant dispute resolution port and merchant IP must be provided. These 
settings can be loaded either from a settings file or by manually typing them. After the 
settings are changed, the third-party program must be restarted for these new settings. 
 After completing the steps mentioned above, the system is ready to commence e-
commerce transactions. 
6.1.4 Performance Issues 
 The implementation is tested on an Intel Celeron 1333 MHz computer with 240 
MB RAM. Tables 5, 6 and 7 show the cryptographic operation count for the client, 
merchant, and third party respectively per protocol run. In Table 6 and Table 5, i is the 
chain key index. The trusted third party’s dispute resolution phase takes 0,3 seconds on 
average of ten runs of the protocol. Table 8 shows the cryptographic operation count of 
the third party’s certification process per product. In Table 8, n is the number of 
requested certificates.  Certification times for several files are shown in Table 9. Each of 
the results obtained in Table 9 is average of 10 runs of the certification process over 
certain files. The trusted third party has to save 526 bytes per product. The time of the 
third party’s dispute resolution phase and the time to certify a product consists of 
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cryptographic operations, file input/output operations, time to read/write from/to a 
remote Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Table and network socket operations (read/write). 
Note that, since the e-goods are large, most of the time is spent on file input/output 
operations. 
 
Table 5. Client Cryptographic Operation Count 
 
Normal Protocol 
Run 
Dispute Resolution 
Run 
RSA Signature 
Generation 
2 1 
RSA Signature 
Verification 
3 1 
MD5 Hash 1 0 
Rijndael 
Decryption 
1 1 
RSA 
Decryption 
1 1 
 
Table 6. Merchant Cryptographic Operation Count 
 
Normal Protocol 
Run 
Dispute 
Resolution 
Run 
RSA Signature 
Generation 
2 0 
RSA Signature 
Verification 
2 1 
SHA1 HMAC 
Generation 
i-1 0 
MD5 Hash i-1 0 
RSA 
Encryption 
1 0 
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Table 7. Third Party Cryptographic Operation Count 
 
Dispute 
Resolution Run 
RSA Signature 
Generation 
1 
RSA Signature 
Verification 
1 
SHA1 HMAC 
Generation 
i-1 
MD5 Hash i-1 
RSA Encryption 1 
 
Table 8. Third Party Certification Cryptographic Operation Count 
Operation Count 
RSA Signature Generation n 
SHA1 HMAC Generation n-1 
MD5 Hash n 
Rijndael Encryption n 
 
Table 9. Third Party Certification Times 
File Size (Mega 
Bytes) 
I/O Read Write Time 
(Seconds) 
Certificate Production 
time (Seconds) 
Total Time (Seconds) 
716 277.97 185.63 463.6 
470 223.3 126.94 350.24 
250 122.21 77.41 199.62 
157 79.21 55.79 135 
 
 Table 10 and 11 shows comparison of several optimistic protocols to the proposed 
e-commerce protocol for cryptographic operations that occurs during online 
transactions. Note that in Table 10 and 11 the symbol [*] represents the proposed e-
commerce protocol. Table 10 shows cryptographic operation count in case of no 
disputes and table 11 shows cryptographic operation count in case of disputes. In [4 and 
7] the authors omitted authentication and integrity of each message for sake of 
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simplicity. For this reason, in table 10, the cryptographic operation count due to 
message authentication and integrity of the proposed e-commerce protocol is also 
omitted. Furthermore, all assumptions on digital envelopes [1, 12] (See Section 2.3.3 for 
details) are taken in to consideration while calculating cryptographic operation count if 
applicable. In table 10 and 11 i is the chain key index (see Section 4.3 for details). Note 
that in table 11 the column [7] has different outcomes of asymmetric 
encryption/decryption operation count because of the different types of disputes (see [7] 
for details). 
Table 10. Comparison of Several Protocols for Cryptographic Operation Count (No 
Disputes) 
 [*] [4] [7] 
Symmetric Enc/Dec 1 3 1 
Asymmetric Enc/Dec 2 5 13 
Hash i 4 4 
MAC i -1 0 0 
 
Table 11. Comparison of Several Protocols for Cryptographic Operation Count 
(Disputes)  
 [*] [4] [7] 
Symmetric Enc/Dec 2 4 1 
Asymmetric Enc/Dec 4 7 12 OR 13 OR 15 
Hash 2i -1 5 4 
MAC 2i -2 0 0 
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6.2 Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol  
 During the development of the Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol, the initial 
plan had been to use AVI [39] formatted movie files for multimedia files. The reason 
for this choice was the popularity of this format and that it yields highly compressed 
audio and video streams, which are of high quality. The Fair Multimedia Exchange 
Protocol required that AVI formatted movie files be programmatically divided (see 
Chapter 5 for details) in to smaller pieces on the end of one entity while the same movie 
pieces were programmatically concatenated by another entity on the other end. 
However, problems arose during the development of concatenation; the ready-made 
AVI methods failed to function. For this reason, instead of using AVI formatted movie 
files text files that represent AVI files have been deployed. The aim of developing the 
Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol was to calculate the cost of the protocol; therefore 
using text files instead of AVI formatted movie files has no negative effect on the 
results. 
 In the following sections, cryptographic methods, system requirements, 
deployment of system, and performance measurements of the implementation are 
described. 
6.2.1 Cryptographic Methods 
 The part below describes some important cryptographic methods deployed such as 
random symmetric key generator, initialization vector generator, rijndael 
encrypt/decrypt, rsa sign/verify and create public/private keys. 
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6.2.1.1 Random Symmetric Key Generator 
 This method generates 128-bit random symmetric keys to be used for HMAC and 
Rijndael Encryption/Decryption operations. 
6.2.1.2 Initialization Vector Generator 
 This method generates random 128-bit initialization vectors for Rijndael 
Encryption/Decryption Operations. 
6.2.1.3 Rijndael Encrypt/Decrypt 
 The Encrypt method performs Rijndael encryption. This method gets an input file 
name (name of the file to be encrypted), an output file name (encrypted file name), an 
initialization vector and a rijndael key as parameter.  
 The Decrypt method performs Rijndael decryption. This method gets an input file 
name (encrypted file name), an output file name (decrypted file name), an initialization 
vector and a rijndael key as parameter. 
6.2.1.4 RSA Sign/Verify 
 The method RSA Sign generates RSA signatures using SHA1 for 160-bit message 
digest generation. This method gets a private-key and the message to be signed as 
parameter. Furthermore, the signature is returned.  
 The method RSA Verify verifies RSA signatures using SHA1 for 160-bit message 
digest generation. This method gets a public-key, a message and signature of a message 
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as parameter. Furthermore, this method returns true if the signature is verified, false if 
the signature is not verified. 
6.2.1.5 Create Public/Private Keys 
 This method generates random RSA public and private keys and stores them in 
separate files. 
6.2.2 Requirements 
 In order to run the programs, it is enough to have Microsoft .Net Framework 1.1 
[36]. 
6.2.3 Deployment of the System 
 Implementation software is available at the project web page [30]. In order to use 
the project the Fair Exchange program must be downloaded. Microsoft .Net Framework 
1.1 must be installed. 
 In order to run the Fair Exchange program, firstly, some setting parameters such 
as remote computers IP number, remote computer port number, public-key filename, 
private-key filename, remote computer public-key filename and the location of the text 
file to be exchanged (text file represents a multimedia file) must be provided. These 
settings can be loaded either form a settings file or by manually typing them. After the 
settings are provided the server, which listens for connections, may be started. In order 
to do so, the Apply Settings button must be pressed. In a similar way the client program, 
which initiates the protocol, may be started by pressing the Send button. A confirmation 
dialog box for quality control appears on each exchange (for both client and server). At 
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this step, half of the expected text files are downloaded. The user must investigate these 
text files for quality control. If the user confirms the quality the rest of the text files are 
downloaded. If not the protocol is terminated without violation of the fairness property. 
 In order to create easily text files with different sizes a group box named Create 
Text File containing a text box and a button is designed. While running the program one 
must input the desired size (in terms of megabytes) to the text box and press the Create 
Text File button to create a text file.  
6.2.4 Performance Issues 
 Table 12 shows cryptographic operation count of the proposed Fair Multimedia 
Exchange Protocol. P represents the number of pieces that the multimedia file is 
divided. Rijndael symmetric keys are 128 bit. As explained in Section 5.3, in the last 
step of the protocol, the two entities involved in the transaction exchange bits of all 
keys. However, this means that each entity sends 128 messages. This amount of 
messages creates unnecessary traffic. In order to overcome this problem, instead of 
transmitting bit-by-bit, the first 64 bits are transferred in groups of 8 bits, the next 16 
bits are transferred in groups of 2 bits and the last 48 bits are transferred bit-by-bit. 
Doing so, instead of transmitting 128 messages at this step 64 messages are transmitted. 
Table 12. Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol Cryptographic Operation Count 
Rijndael 
Encryption 
Rijndael 
Decryption 
RSA 
Signature 
Verification 
RSA 
Signature 
Generation 
RSA 
Encryption 
RSA 
Decryption 
P 2P 1 + 2P + 64 1 + 2P + 64 P/2 P 
 
 Figure 18 shows the time required to divide and encrypt files, which is an offline 
process that is performed before transmission of any network message. The values in 
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this figure are the average of 10 runs of the protocol. As it can be seen from the figure, 
the time required to divide and encrypt files is not affected by the number of pieces. 
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Figure 18. File Division Time 
 One of the most important parameters is the network buffer size. In other words, 
the network buffer size is the maximum amount of data to be stored in a byte array 
variable, which is subsequently sent through a network socket. If the network buffer is 
too large, the primary memory is overloaded. In Microsoft Windows Operating System 
[40] when the memory is overloaded, the system starts paging. In other words, the 
system treats the hard disk as a virtual memory and writes excessive data to secondary 
memory (hard disk). Although this property provides extra memory, the execution time 
of an operation diminishes since secondary memory operates much slower than primary 
memory. If the network buffer is too small, the overhead increases because the total 
amount of commands and controls increases. In order to investigate optimum buffer size 
and to calculate the overhead of the fair exchange protocol an exchange program is 
developed. This program has no security features and it is used for file exchange. Figure 
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19 shows time to perform exchange (with no security) of a 600 MB text file with 
varying network buffer sizes. The values in this figure are the average of 10 runs of the 
program. As it can be seen from the figure, the optimum network-buffer size is 4 MB. 
Therefore, the size of the network-buffer in the fair exchange application is fixed to 4 
MB. 
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Figure 19. Exchange (No Security) Time with Varying Buffer Size 
 
 Figure 20 shows time to perform fair exchange of 600 MB files with variable 
number of pieces. The values in this figure are the average of 10 runs of the protocol. 
As expected, if the number of pieces increases the exchange becomes more secure (see 
Section 5 for details) however, the overhead increases and therefore the total amount of 
time to finish the exchange increases. The overhead increases since the number of 
Rijndael encryption/decryption, RSA encryption/decryption and signature 
generation/verification is directly proportional to the number of pieces as depicted in 
Table 12. Furthermore, an increase in the number of pieces augments the number of 
commands and controls due to the programming of the system. 
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File Size = 600MB, Buffer Size = 4 MB
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Figure 20. Fair Exchange Time (File Size = 600MB, Buffer Size = 4MB )  
 
 The overhead of the fair exchange protocol is calculated as follows. The exchange 
protocol, which has no security features takes minimum 213,49 seconds in order to 
barter 600 MB data using a buffer of size 4 MB, however the fair exchange protocol 
requires minimum 672,42 seconds in order to barter the same amount of data and with 
the same amount of buffer size. This shows that the overhead takes 458,93 seconds and 
that the fair exchange of an 600 MB file is exchanged approximately 3 times slower 
than the exchange application with no security. 
  
 Figure 21 shows an e-commerce protocol in which a client pays money in order to 
download a multimedia file. It is assumed that the client has selected a multimedia file 
to download and that using Payment Tokens (see Section 4.2 and SET in [1] for details) 
is a valid payment method. Furthermore, the client assumes that the merchant will not 
try to cheat, by ending the protocol prematurely, after he/she has been paid. In other 
words, the client trusts the merchant.  
 
 In the First message, the client sends a payment token, a session key encrypted 
with the merchant’s public-key and the digital signature of the first message to the 
merchant. The merchant, receiving the first message, first checks the digital signature of 
that message and then the token for validity by contacting a bank entity. If satisfied, the 
merchant decrypts the encrypted session key with his/her private key and obtains the 
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session key KS as follows: DKRM(EKUM(KS)) = = KS where D is the decryption 
operation and KRM is merchant’s private-key. Subsequently, in the second message, 
the merchant sends the multimedia file that the client has requested encrypted with the 
session key KS and the digital signature of the second message to the client. The client, 
receiving the second message, first checks the digital signature of the message; second 
he/she decrypts the encrypted multimedia file using the session key KS and obtains the 
multimedia file MMedia_File as follows: DKS(EKS(MMedia_File)) = = MMedia_File. 
 
 
1) CÎM: Token|| EKUM(KS) || Signature 
2) MÎC : EKS(MMedia_File) || Signature 
 
Symbol Meaning 
C Client 
M Merchant 
KUM Public-key of the Merchant 
KS A symmetric session key 
MMedia_File A multimedia file 
EK(Data) Encryption of Data with key K 
Signature Digital Signature of a message 
Token E-Money 
Figure 21. Multimedia E-Commerce Protocol 
 
 The Multimedia E-Commerce Protocol, described in Figure 21, is implemented in 
order to compare the Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol with a different type of 
protocol. It should be remembered that in the Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol, the 
two entities involved do not trust each other; however, in the Multimedia E-Commerce 
Protocol, the client must trust the merchant. Furthermore, the architecture of the Fair 
Multimedia Exchange Protocol is peer-to-peer; however, the architecture of the 
Multimedia E-Commerce Protocol is client/server. Client-server architecture 
applications have the disadvantage of single point of failure. Moreover, for this 
architecture, the cost of maintaining a continuous operation may be large. In the 
implementation of the Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol, the total amount of 
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exchanged data is 600*2 = 1200 MB; since each entity transmits a 600 MB multimedia 
file to the other. However, in the Multimedia E-Commerce Protocol the total amount of 
exchanged data is 600 MB since only one multimedia file is transmitted by the 
merchant. 
  
 The implementation results show that using a file of size 600 MB takes 318,47 
seconds and using a file of size 1200 MB takes 617,29 seconds on average. The best 
time (with 8 Pieces) of the Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol was 672,42 seconds. 
Therefore, although the Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol has the architectural and 
trust-relation advantages, the time required to complete the protocol is close to the time 
required to complete the Multimedia E-Commerce Protocol when the same amount of 
exchanged data is assumed. However, when assuming a 600 MB file in the Multimedia 
E-Commerce Protocol, this protocol takes approximately half the time required by the 
Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 In this thesis, an optimistic fair e-commerce protocol for large e-goods and a fair 
multimedia exchange protocol have been presented.  
 
 The optimistic fair e-commerce protocol is efficient since, even in cases of 
disputes, the large product is transferred only once to the customer and a small number 
and size of messages are needed to establish the protocol. Disputes are resolved by the 
third party within the protocol, not by gathering evidence and taking them to a court 
afterwards. The third party does not have to store e-goods or protocol messages even in 
case of disputes. Furthermore, the client’s identity is kept anonymous; no information 
about the customer’s preferences can be gathered through the protocol. The experiment 
results show that the protocol requires low resource usage and therefore has good 
performance. Moreover, dispute resolution has low load on the trusted third party in 
terms of both the amount of data to be stored and the cryptographic operations to be 
computed. As a result, the trusted third party does not create a bottleneck in the 
network. 
  
 The optimistic fair e-commerce protocol has client-server architecture; however, 
the fair multimedia exchange protocol requires a peer-to-peer architecture. Due to this 
architectural difference, both protocols require different fair exchange methods and used 
for different applications. Client-server architecture applications have the disadvantage 
of single point of failure. Furthermore, for this architecture the cost of maintaining 
continuous operation may be large. Therefore, peer-to-peer architectures are preferred 
over client-server architectures. Although the multimedia exchange protocol has a 
architectural advantage, the experiment results show that this protocol has large 
overhead compared to the fair e-commerce protocol. 
 
 A future work that will increase the efficiency and security of the proposed 
optimistic fair e-commerce protocol is as follows: 
  67 
 
 In order to diminish the time of the offline certification process of the optimistic 
e-commerce protocol, some methods can be implemented. Instead of encrypting the 
entire product file, a method for corrupting the file by encrypting some bytes of the 
product file may be implemented.   
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8 APPENDIX: FORMS 
8.1 Fair E-Commerce Protcol 
8.1.1 Trusted Third Party Forms 
 
Figure 22. Trusted Third Party Form, Product Certification 
 
  69 
 
Figure 23. Trusted Third Party Form, Settings Page 1 
 
 
Figure 24. Trusted Third Party Form, Settings Page 2 
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Figure 25. Trusted Third Party Form, Settings Page 3 
8.1.2 Merchant Forms 
 
Figure 26. Merchant Form, New Certificate Registration 
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Figure 27. Merchant Form, Settings Page 1 
 
 
Figure 28. Merchant Form, Settings Page 2 
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Figure 29. Merchant Form, Settings Page 3 
 
 
Figure 30. Merchant Form, Settings Page 4 
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8.1.3 Client Forms 
 
Figure 31. Client Form, Product Search and Purchase 
 
 
Figure 32. Client Form, Settings Page 1 
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Figure 33. Client Form, Settings Page 2 
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8.2 Fair Multimedia Exchange Protocol 
 
Figure 34. Fair Multimedia Exchange Form 
 
 
Figure 35. Quality Control Confirm Dialog Box 
 
 
Figure 36. Exchange Complete Declaration Dialog Box 
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8.3 Multimedia Exchange Program 
 
Figure 37. Multimedia Exchange Form 
 
 
Figure 38. Exchange Complete Declaration Dialog Box 
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8.4 Multimedia E-Commerce Protocol 
 
Figure 39. Multimedia E-Commerce Merchant Form 
 
 
Figure 40. Multimedia E-Commerce Client Form 
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